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Outline:
1. Editorial: „Risk equalisation in voluntary health insurance 
markets‟ (Armstrong, Paolucci, van de Ven);
2. „Risk equalisation and voluntary health insurance markets: The 
case of Australia‟ (Connelly, Paolucci, Butler, Collins);
3. „Risk equalisation and voluntary health insurance in Ireland‟ 
(Armstrong);
4. „Risk equalisation in the South African voluntary health 
insurance market‟ (McLeod, Grobler);
5. Risk equalisation in voluntary health insurance 
markets: a three country comparison.
Agenda
1. Overview of health financing in the 3-
countries;
2. Voluntary private health insurance (VPHI) 
and risk-equalisation (RE) in the 3-
countries;
3. Conclusions and discussion.
Part 1.
Overview of health financing 
in the 3-countries
Australia (1)
 Mix of public-private financing & delivery of 
health services:
• Public health insurance (Medicare, 1984). (68% 
of THE).
• Out-of-pocket payments. (24% of THE).
• Competitive VPHI. (8% of THE).
Australia (2)
 Medicare (1984):
• Tax funded universal mandatory coverage;
• „Free‟ treatment as a public patient in a public 
hospital;
• Subsidies for private medical services (Medicare 




• Supplementary coverage for (parts of) the costs of services not 
covered by Medicare (e.g. hospital charges levied by private 
hospitals);







 Public/private mix of funding & delivery
of healthcare (almost identical to Australia):
- Tax-funded public health insurance scheme; 
- VPHI market; 
- Out of pocket expenditures.
Ireland (2)
 VPHI market commenced in 1957 with 
establishment of Vhi Healthcare & provides:
• Duplicative coverage to universal entitlement of 
public hospitals*;
• Substitutive GP-care coverage for non- Medical 
Card holders;
• Supplementary coverage.
• Employer based schemes (60%) or directly by 
individuals.
South Africa (1)
 Public/private financing & delivery of healthcare:
Public sector (40% of  THE) Private sector (60% of  THE)
Universal tax-funded with allocated budgets for 
public healthcare facilities.
VPHI market (1889) known as „medical 
schemes‟ since 1967 covering on a voluntary 
basis 15% of  the population (i.e. high-income 
groups)
64% of  the population depends on it for all 
conventional healthcare services 
A further 21% of  the population use private 
GP and pharmacies on OOP-basis and for the 
rest relies on the public scheme
Salaried staff FFS
Care is virtually „free‟ at the point of  service for 
unemployed and low-income people (e.g. user 




- Substitutive coverage & delivery via private healthcare providers, 
predominantly fee-for-service.
- Not for-profit MS, owned by their members. 
- Brokers are paid commissions for taking members to open 
schemes – 9,742 individual health brokers while there are only 7,000
GPs. 
- Fiercely competitive market (i.e. high switching rates). 
Part 2.
VPHI & RE in the 3-countries
Outline of VPHI markets
Australia Ireland South Africa
% population covered by 
VPHI
47% 52% 15%
People covered by VPHI 10.9 million 2.2 million 7.8 million
VPHI expenses as % of  
total national hc expenses
8 % 12% 55%
Do consumers have free















Costs  >AU$50,000 
are shared.
100% 100%
Market structure for VPHI
Australia Ireland South Africa
Number of  open 
undertakings
25 3 41
Market share largest 
insurer
30% 66% 25%




and/or tax-credits for 
PHI purchase? 
Yes 
(Rebate and Medicare 
Levy Surcharge)
Yes Yes (but no subsidies 










Very high Very high Very high
Common elements
VPHI-markets
 Flexibility for benefit package design is an 
effective tool for market segmentation and thereby 
undermines community rating: indirect 
premium differentiation via product 
differentiation.
Adverse and risk selection are 
significant problems!
Risk selection: tools


























 Competitive VPHI markets require the 
enforcement of regulations/subsidies to achieve 
affordability, efficiency and prevent selection.
 The current forms of subsidies for VPHI in the 3 
countries:
a. Premium-adjusted subsidies;
b. Community rating per insurer per product;




 Effective in achieving affordability.
 But, not optimal:
• They reduce the consumers‟ and insurers‟ incentives for 
efficiency:
» Less effective price-competition and risk of 
premium inflation;
» A welfare loss because of the moral hazard due 
to over-insurance.
• They create a misallocation of subsidies.
 tradeoff affordability - efficiency
b. Community rating
 Goal:  to create implicit cross-subsidies from the low-risks 
to the high-risks.
 Effect: Such pooling of people with different risks creates 
substantial predictable profits and losses for subgroups 
and thereby create incentives for risk-selection. 
 tradeoff affordability - selection
c. Risk-equalisation
 A usual definition of risk equalisation:
„A mechanism to equalise the risk profiles 
among insurers with the objective that the ex-ante
risk profiles of each insurer become identical.‟ 
 This is done by calculating premium subsidies based 
on risk-adjusted predicted individual health 
expenses. These subsidies are given to the insurer 













C=Contribution;   S=Subsidy;  P=Premium.
Modalities of  risk equalisation
Effects of RE
Eliminate incentives for risk-
selection; 
No distortions of premium 
competition (efficiency);
Achieve affordability in competitive 
PHI markets.
Australia: is it RE?
 Although in Australia it is called „risk 
equalisation‟, it is a claims cost equalisation (CE):
„A mechanism to equalise the claims-
costs among insurers with the objective that 
the ex-post costs per person of each insurer 
become identical.‟
 This is done by enforcing ex-post costs-based 
compensations between insurers.
Services covered under the Australian scheme (figures in 
parentheses are the proportion of the total benefits being 
equalised):
• Hospital benefits (97.6%)
• Hospital substitute benefits (0.05%)
• Chronic Disease Management Program benefits (0.07%)




















Risk Equalisation Trust Fund (RETF) 
Sum of payments 
into the RETF = Sum 
of payments out of 














‘Risk’ vs. ‘Claims cost’
 Risk equalisation:
A mechanism to equalise the risk profiles among 
insurers with the objective that the ex-ante risk 
profiles of each insurer become identical. 
 Claims cost equalisation:
A mechanism to equalise the claims cost among 
insurers with the objective that the ex-post costs per 
person of each insurer become identical.
Effects of CE
 Highly imperfect matching with the „true‟ risk 
structure of  insurers‟ population resulting in 
over/under compensations (i.e. misallocation of  
subsidies).
 Strong incentives for selection (historically a 
constant threat to the stability of  PHI market in 
Australia).
 Lack of  incentives for efficiency.  
The preferred strategy
 Effects of ‘PAS’ and ‘CE’ : reduction of incentives for efficiency;
 Effects of ‘CRP’: risk selection; and premium differentiation via 
product differentiation.
 Risk equalisation (RE) first-best strategy to escape from the 
tradeoffs between affordability, efficiency and selection (van de 
Ven & Schut 2008-7; Paolucci et al. 2006):
 In the case of perfect risk equalisation there is no need for any 
other strategy and no tradeoff exists.
 Each of the other strategies inevitably confronts policymakers 
with a tradeoff. 
‘Risk Equalisation’
Australia Ireland South Africa
„RE‟: year of  
implementation
2007 No transfers 
(most recent 
regulations 2003)
planned for 2010, but 
legislation still not 
passed
Policy rationale for 
„RE‟
To support CRP 
(risk-solidarity)
To increase industry 
stability i.e. prevent 
selection
To support CRP 
(risk-solidarity)
To increase industry 
stability
To support CRP (risk-
solidarity) 
To facilitate the 
introduction of  Social 
Health Insurance
Risk factors  age
 health status proxy, 
i.e. a cap on the 
maximum insurer‟s 
costs per person over 
a rolling 12-month 
period.
 age, gender;
 reserve power for 
health status proxy, 
i.e. private bed nights.
 age;
 numbers with 25 
defined chronic 
diseases, with HIV and 






A, I & SA
Similarities: 
 Universal basic public system;
 Voluntary private health insurance (VPHI) market with 
consumer choice of „level‟ of coverage and competition 
among „risk-bearing‟ insurers; 
 Regulation & subsidies in VPHI markets:
• Restrictions on the ability of insurers to charge risk-related premiums (i.e. 
community rating);
• Other incentives and subsidies in place for particular policy objectives. 
• Risk equalisation.
Differences 
between A, I & SA
Differences:
 history;
 relative level of wealth;
 the role of VPHI in the overall health 
system;
 ……
 Definition of ‘Risk Equalisation’!
Conclusions and discussion
 Risk selection is a signifcant problem;
 In case of voluntary health insurance: adverse selection is an 
additional problem;
 Risk equalisation is very complex, both technically and 
politically; and also the legal issues;
 Community rating: goal or tool? 
 Rationale for (subsidising) VPHI?
 From VPHI towards NHI?
Community rating: 
goal or tool?
 As a Goal: Each person in the community pays 
more or less the same premium.
 As a Tool: Regulation that creates predictable 
profits/losses, and thereby incentives for selection 
that undermines the goal of community rating;
 Are there more effective tools to achieve the goal?
Rationale for (subsidising) VPHI?
1. What is the rationale for buying voluntary private health 
insurance (VPHI), given a  universal basic public system? 
Answer: to pass the queue and reduce waiting times and 
to receive care with better (perceived) quality. 
2. What then is the rationale for subsidising (tax penalties, 
premium subsidies 30-40%, „risk equalisation‟), and 
regulating (open enrolment, community rating) VPHI?
Answer: reduce pressure on public system (& finance) 
and increase choice.
From VPHI to SHI?
All 3-countries have been considering the introduction of  Social Health 
Insurance (NHI) in the sense of  universal mandatory insurance with 
consumer choice of  (competing) health funds:
• Australia: National Health & Hospitals Reforms Commission 
(NHHRC) – “Medicare Select”;
• Ireland: Fine Gael‟s “FairCare”;
• South Africa: 
• „Social Health Insurance‟ proposed since 1994; 
• New elected Government in 2009: “within 5 years” National 
Health Insurance.
From VPHI to NHI:
Preconditions
 Good risk equalisation;
 Effective competition policy;
 Consumer information (price, quality);
 Transparency (e.g. insurance products);
 Product classification system;
 Supervision of quality of care;
 Sufficient contracting freedom (price, quality, selective 
contracting);
 Political support (bi-partisan) for sequential 
implementation;
 ….., ….,  …..
Risk equalisation is 
critical
 Good risk equalisation is an essential (but not the only) 
precondition to efficient competitive health 
insurance/provision markets (with open enrollment & 
community rating).
 Without good risk equalisation the disadvantages of 
competition might outweight advantages of a competitive 
market. 
 Risk equalisation should not only be based on age/gender, 
but also on health status. 
US reforms?
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
establishes various tiers of health insurance coverage for 
three primary purposes:
• To set the universal mandatory coverage for a minimum 
standardised package of services (or pay a federal tax penalty 
beginning in 2014). 
• Premium and cost-sharing subsidies provided to lower and 
middle income people buying their own insurance in 
Exchanges. 
ACA (I)
 Four actuarial value levels: 60% (a bronze plan), 70% (a 
sliver plan), 80% (a gold plan), and 90% (a platinum 
plan). 
 The ACA also requires that plans cap the maximum out-
of-pocket costs for enrollees, based on the out-of-pocket 
limits in high-deductible plans that are eligible to be 
paired with a Health Savings Account. 
 Most people will be required to have insurance that is at 
least at the bronze level (a 60% actuarial value) or pay a 
federal tax penalty. 
ACA (II)
 People who buy coverage on their own through an 
Exchange and have family income up to four times the 
poverty level ($89,400 for a family of four and $43,560 for 
a single individual in 2011) may be eligible for premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies:
• The premium subsidies are based on family income and the 
premium (adjusted for age) of the second lowest cost silver plan 
(70% actuarial value) in an Exchange. 
• Low and modest income people buying insurance in 
Exchanges may be eligible for coverage with a higher actuarial 




c. Community rating per product.
• Effects of a and b: reduction of incentives for efficiency 
(e.g. premium inflation, moral hazard…);
• Effects of c: risk selection; and premium differentiation 
via product differentiation.
Why not risk-adjusted subsidies?
Universal Mandatory 
Coverage
Many OECD countries have introduced 
universal mandatory coverage for a uniform
benefits or services package (BP). 
Policy-makers see universal/uniform 
mandatory coverage as a tool to achieve the 
goal of affordable access to (the coverage of) 
health care services to vulnerable groups 
(e.g. low-income or high-risks individuals). 
Problem
 If the financing/insurance of uniform BP is not 
sustainable/affordable for certain groups of 
individuals it does not make sense to mandate to 
buy it; 
 If subsidies guarantee affordable access to health 
care services/coverage for vulnerable groups, what 
is the rationale for universal/uniform mandatory 
coverage?
Proposition
Proposition: the arguments that motivate a system 
of mandatory cross-subsidies differ substantially 
from those that motivate mandatory coverage.
What are the economic rationales for governments 
to enforce a system of mandatory cross-subsidies 
and to implement mandatory coverage for a set of 
predefined services? 
Promising directions to 
proceed
 Single-option scheme with voluntary income-related 
deductibles (i.e. the higher the income, the higher the 
deductible).
 Allow insurers to risk rate & replace community rating by a 
premium rate band;
 Replace the premium and cost-sharing subsidies by risk-
adjusted subsidies.
Effects:
 Less selection, both by consumers and by insurers;
 Policy goal of affordability more likely to be achieved;
 Increase incentives for efficiency (consumers, insurers).
